Technocratic government and economic policy by Alexiadou, Despina
Alexiadou, Despina (2018) Technocratic government and economic 
policy. In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University 
Press, New York. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/63539/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
	 1	
TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY 
Despina Alexiadou 
University of Strathclyde 
 
Forthcoming at the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Ed. William Thompson. New 
York: Oxford University Press 
 
Summary 
The recent surge in the appointments of technocrats to the top economic portfolios of finance, 
and even the formation of fully technocratic governments in Europe raises questions 
regarding the role of technocrats and technocratic governments in economic policy in 
democracies. Who are the technocrats? Why are they appointed in the first place? What is 
their impact on economic policy and finally what their sources of policy influence?  
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Introduction 
A record number of news articles and editorials have been written in the press according to 
Lexis Nexis since 2011, the year that both Greece and Italy were governed by technocratic 
led governments to handle the unprecedented financial and political crises. The elevated 
interest in the role of technocracy in public life has since remained rather high, compared to 
earlier years, as one can clearly see in Figure 1. While the role of technocrats in democracies 
is hotly debated among journalists and policymakers, we have limited systematic knowledge 
about the role of technocrats in democracies and more specifically in governmentsÕ economic 
management. 
 
Figure 1:  
 
 
Technocrats have held prominent positions in governments, especially during periods of 
economic and political crises. Since 2009 the number of technocrat finance and employment 
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cabinet ministers more than doubled in Europe (Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2015). Recently, a 
former Ukranian technocrat economics minister openly endorsed a fully technocratic 
government Òfree from political connectionsÕ as the best way to ensure the country proceeds 
with the reforms that started since the 2014 revolution (Buckley 2016).  
Furthermore, technocratic governments and technocrat cabinet ministers are not unique to 
Europe. Technocrats and technopols, liberalized the labour and capital markets during the 
1980s and 1990s debt crises in many Latin American countries with lasting effects in the 
countries economies and polities (Roberts 2017; Dargent 2015).  
 
WhatÕs the role of technocrats and technocratic governments in economic policy? Do 
technocrats affect the economy? Do their appointments have long-term effects in economic 
policymaking? Do they adopt policies that are in line with democratic mandates or do they 
have an influence above and beyond their mandate? And why are technocrats appointed in 
the first place?  
 
There questions have only recently started to enter the scholarly debate, despite earlier 
treatments from scholars who study economic reforms and democratic transitions in Latin 
America (Santiso 2003; Schneider 1998; Joignant 2011). The lack in scholarly work that 
examines the role of technocrats is puzzling given the plethora of opinions expressed in the 
media about the role of technocrats in todaysÕ democratic societies (Rampell 2011; Harford 
2017) and the elevated interest in technocrats and technocratic governments in the press. For 
example, non-elected experts are often referred to as technocrats, but so is Hillary Clinton, 
the 2016 US presidential candidate, former first lady and elected senator for decades.  
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This essay has two main goals. First, to clearly discuss the different definitions of 
technocracy and technocrats, thus providing a road map to the debates on technocracy. 
Second to review the literature on the role of technocrats in economic policymaking in 
democracies. The essay concludes with suggestions for future research regarding the role of 
technocracy in economic policy.  
 
Defining Technocracy, Technocrats, and Technopols 
 
Who is a technocrat? To assess the role of technocrats in policy we need to be clear about 
how we define technocrats and technocratic governments. There are three substantially 
different ways of defining technocrats.  
 
The most encompassing definition of a technocrat is one that includes all experts who are 
involved in the policymaking process of the government. These could be elected politicians 
with policy expertise, cabinet ministers or advisors appointed to the cabinet straight from the 
industry or academia, as well as permanent bureaucrats in various government departments 
and agencies, such as central bank governors. This definition rests on the premise that when 
experts take on political roles, they become technocrats  (Meynaud 1964). Scholars who use 
this definition of technocracy are primarily interested in the effects of policymakersÕ 
education and professional experience on policy choices and  outcomes (Alexiadou 2016; 
Chwieroth 2007; Christensen 2017; Hallerberg and Wehner 2017; Kaplan 2017; Adolph 
2013). The focus is on policymakersÕ policy preferences and way of thinking, which are 
independent of their career incentives. A professor of economics or a central banker who 
holds a PhD in economics from a top US school will have similar preferences and will make 
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similar policy choices as a cabinet minister who is a professional politician and has the same 
educational background.  
 
An alternative, more restrictive definition of technocrats is one that clearly separates 
policymakersÕ expertise from their career incentives. According to this definition, an elected 
politician with clear political ambitions who has policy expertise, or else a technopol, is 
different from a non-elected expert, or a technocrat, who is appointed to an executive 
position. Specifically, according to Joignant (2011) the confusion in the interchangeable use 
of the terms technopols and technocrats is due to the fact that scholars assign a great 
importance to policymakersÕ university credentials and ÔtechÕ resources. ÒHowever, this 
ignores the fact that a technopol also has political resources, generally in the form of 
previously held positions of formal power in a political party or parties before joining the 
government, which is precisely not a characteristic of a technocratÓ(Joignant 2011). 
 
On a similar line of thought, McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014) define a technocrat as a prime 
minister or a minister who Òat the time of his/her appointment to government, he/she: (1) has 
never held public office under the banner of a political party; (2) is not a formal member of 
any party; (3) is said to possess recognized non-party political expertise which is directly 
relevant to the role occupied in government.Ó 
 
For Joignant (2011) clearly separating technocrats from technopols is crucial because 
technopols possess political resources that technocrats do not. For McDonnell and Valbruzzi 
(2014), separating technocrats from partisans is crucial for identifying policymakersÕ 
underlying policy preferences since partisans align with their formal party, unlike 
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technocrats. This is after all why technocratic governments raise questions of accountability 
and representation (Pastorella 2016). 
 
Clearly differentiating technocrats from technopols is further justified by the fact that 
policymakersÕ career incentives directly affect their commitment to policy reforms. While 
partisan preferences are crucial for identifying the direction of policy change, commitment to 
certain set of reforms is strongly influenced by policymakersÕ career incentives. This 
argument builds on work from Alesina and Tabellini (2007), Adolph (2013) and Alexiadou 
(2016) that argue that career incentives strongly affect policymakersÕ policy effectiveness.  
 
According to Alesina and Tabellini (2008), a policymakerÕs effectiveness to implement a 
policy reform  is a function of her effort,  and ability, : 
(1) 
 
A technopolÕs ability or skill changes slowly and is partly known to the prime minister from 
past performance. An experienced politician who holds a PhD in economics would score high 
on her ability to formulate economic policy, but her commitment to implement a policy that 
is politically unpopular might be questioned. In other words, while she would score high on 
ability, she would score low on effort. In contrast, a technocrat would score high both on 
technical skill and on effort to the extent that her personal cost for adopting unpopular 
measures is low. Therefore, two cabinet ministers with equal expertise in economics can 
differ in the effort they put into the task of policy reform depending on their career concerns 
(Alexiadou 2015, 2016; Blondel 1991; Alesina and Tabellini 2008; Alexiadou and Gunaydin 
2015; Adolph 2013). This not to say that technocrats will be more effective in policy reform 
than technopols. That is an empirical question, as political experience and position in the 
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party are crucial factors for being an effective policymaker as argued by Joignant (2011) and 
shown by Alexiadou (2015, 2016) and Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014). 
 
It is important to note here that the more restrictive definitions of technocrats typically also 
only refer to appointees to the executive branch and do not include permanent bureaucrats. 
While permanent bureaucrats can have substantial policy influence particularly when there is 
a large degree of delegation of policy to bureaucrats, such as to politically independent 
central bankers (Bodea and Hicks 2015) or to influential ministerial departments such as the 
departments of finance (Christensen 2017), in most instances the restrictive definition of 
technocrats is reserved for cabinet ministers that have a direct control of economic policy 
(McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Pinto, Cotta, and Almeida 2017).  
 
It is this latter, more restrictive definition of technocrats that has led scholars to talk about 
technocratic governments. While the term technocrat should not be confused with 
technocratic governments, technocratic governments are defined as those governments that 
primarily consist of non-elected experts. According to McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014) 
technocratic governments are governments whose cabinet ministers are mostly technocrats, 
and/or when the prime minister is a technocrat. In contrast, a cabinet that mostly consists of 
party representatives but includes a few non-elected experts, or technocrats, is not a 
technocratic government. Importantly, a government whose cabinet ministers are in their 
majority policy experts and are also elected members of the parliament are not technocratic 
governments. These should be best described as expert or diploma governments (Bovens and 
Wille 2017). It is not surprising that fully technocratic governments are quite rare and tend to 
form during periods of economic and political crises (Pastorella 2016). 
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None of the definitions above refer to technocracy as Òa system of governance in which 
technically trained experts rule by virtue of their specialized knowledge and position in 
dominant political and economic institutionsÓ (Fischer 1990). This broader definition of 
technocracy is of importance for policy outcomes and is one that has been central in 
academic and public debates, alike (Rosanvallon 2011; Bickerton and Accetti 2017; Berman 
2017). For example, 2016 will be remembered as the year that voters rejected technocracy for 
populism. With two percentage points majority, British voters defied the warnings of experts 
and rejected the technocratic European Union, choosing Brexit. Five months later, Americans 
elected Donald Trump, rejecting Hillary ClintonÕs Ôliberal technocracyÕ  (Accetti 2016; 
Savage 2017). Yet, considering politicians who rely on technical advice to formulate policy, 
such as Hillary Clinton, as technocrats is at the very least confusing. In contrast, according to 
the restrictive definition of technocrats, Macron, the newly elected French president, could be 
considered as a technocrat presidential candidate. At the time of his election, Macron was a 
former investment banker and economics minister who had never held elective office. 
 
Finally, technocrats should not be confused with non-partisans. There is an important 
literature on the appointments of non-partisan cabinet ministers, also known as outsiders 
(Camerlo and Perez-Linan 2015) that is motivated by the large percentage of non-elected 
cabinet ministers appointed in presidential regimes (Amorim and Samuels 2010; Martinez-
Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). While sometimes these non-partisans are referred to as 
technocrats, one has to be careful to not use the two terms interchangeably, especially if the 
goal is to understand the role of technocrats in economic policy. Non-partisans include both 
technocrats and loyal to the president outsiders. Yet, the logics of appointing one over the 
other are diametrically different. Loyal outsiders are loyalists to the president and thus 
faithful agents of the president. In contrast, a technocrat is a policymaker with strong policy 
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convictions who values policy more than office, and is hard to control (also known as an 
ÒideologueÓ) (Alexiadou 2015, 2016).   
 
Technocrats and Their Role in Economic Policy 
WhatÕs the role of technocrats in shaping economic policy? Does it matter whom presidents 
or prime ministers appoint as their finance and economics ministers for policy outcomes? 
This question has important implications for representation and policy outcomes as long as 
technocratic policy solutions contradict the governmentÕs mandate. If technocrats implement 
the governmentÕs partisan agenda, then whom prime ministers appoint makes no difference in 
policy outcomes. If, however technocrats, who are appointed to positions of power, instead 
set the policy agenda, then their appointments have significant implications for both policy 
and representation.  
 
To theorise and examine the role of technocrats we first need to identify both technocratsÕ 
policy preferences and their source of power. Why would an appointee or an agent want and 
be able to formulate policy against the preferences of her principal? A typical assumption 
within comparative politics is that prime ministers or presidents appoint policymakers who 
are close to their own, their partyÕs or their governmentÕs policy preferences (Bck, Debus, 
and Mller 2016). Under this assumption, it should not matter if a prime minister chooses a 
loyal partisan or a technocrat. Since the prime minister appoints this minister and has the 
power to sack her at any point, then cabinet ministers fulfil their principalÕs policy agenda. In 
parliamentary systems, in particular, where representation runs through a long chain of 
delegation from voters to policymakers, the principal-agent relationship is fundamental for  
democratic representation (Strom 2000). Yet, ministerial appointments are a lot more 
complex than often assumed as they often fulfil multiple political and policy-related reasons 
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that have little to do with ministersÕ policy mandates (Dowding and Dumont 2009; Alexiadou 
2016). Consequently, cabinet ministers, and even bureaucrats, do not always faithfully 
represent their principals (Bergman et al. 2003).       
  
To sum up, in order to study the policy effects of technocrats, above and beyond what their 
masters want, we need first to be able to identify their policy preferences and second why and 
how they are able to push forward their agenda. In the following two sections I will discuss 
both these necessary conditions for policy influence. 
 
Technocrats and Ideology 
Often, technocrats are considered ideologically ÔneutralÕ as they are non-partisans. Yet, 
technocracy can never be politically neutral (Fischer 1990) to the extent that policy changes 
have direct distributional and re-distributional consequences. Consider for example the Dutch 
technocrat minister for employment, Aart Jan de Geus who was appointed by the Christian 
democrat prime minister in the early two-thousands. De Geus was neither a party member nor 
a member of parliament, and this is exactly the reason he was selected for this job, according 
to him (personal interview, June 2011). He was explicitly asked by the prime minister to 
deliver reforms that were not favored by the Òold generation of Christian democrats in the 
partyÓ. He needed someone who had personally worked with the social partners- De Geus 
was the vice-president of the Christian trade union, CNV- and who would be determined to 
reform the disability system. According to De Geus the reason he succeeded in his reforms 
was because personal attacks to his personal reputation would not stop his reform efforts. He 
Òcould understand that kind of pressure because he could understand the rules of the gameÓ. 
He further added that Òif you start from outside there are no obligations, no open bills to other 
people. You start with a blank notebookÓ.  
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De GeusÕs policy preferences were largely in line with a lot of policy prescriptions made by 
the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Were they neutral? 
Not quite. They were rather liberal from the point of view of the Dutch trade unions 
(Alexiadou 2016). At the same time, they were more moderate than what many partisan 
ministers from the more right-wing VVD supported (Alexiadou 2016). 
 
When it comes to economic policy in particular, the shift in economic thought from Neo-
Keynesian economics to Neo-Classical economics in the seventies, has meant that 
technocrats, especially those who come from the banking and finance sector but even 
economists trained in top US departments, are further to the right in their ideological 
placement than the average Social-democrat or Christian-democrat party member. Since the 
nineteen eighties there is a strong consensus within the economics discipline about the 
superiority of market conforming policies (Fourcade 2009). These policies typically include 
Òthe deregulation of product markets, labour markets, and financial markets; the liberalization 
of trade; the corporatization and privatization of state entities; and low-rate, broad-base 
reform (Christensen 2017) Moreover, influential governmental think-tanks such as the 
OECD, have been calling for labour-market liberalization and lower income tax for the last 
three decades (OECD 2010). If technocrats, defined as non-elected experts, are primarily 
drawn from the ranks of economists who work in academia, supra-national governmental 
institutions or the banking sectors then they are likely to share similar, market-conforming 
preferences (Santiso 2003). While these policy prescriptions often go against entrenched 
political interests (Christensen 2017; Dargent 2015), they should not be considered as a-
political. Moreover, often technocrats are drawn directly from the financial industry. In this 
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case, one has to be concerned not only about technocratsÕ Ôacademic biasÕ but also about 
these individualsÕ own industryÕs interests (Jopson 2017).  
 
Using data from Alexiadou (2016), I provide an overview of the professional background of 
finance ministers who were never elected compared to the professional background of all 
finance ministers in parliamentary 18 West European countries in Figures 2 and 3 
respectively. It is clear that the vast majority of non-partisan ministers have a background in 
banking, finance or economics, therefore can be defined as technocrats.  
[insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2: Background of finance ministers who were never in elective office 
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Figure 3: Background of all finance ministers 
 
 
Using ministersÕ professional background as a proxy for their policy preferences (Alexiadou 
2016; Chwieroth 2007; Kaplan 2017) we can reasonably assume that technocrats appointed 
to the finance portfolio are very likely to have strong, market-conforming policy preferences. 
This assumption is mostly supported by existing literature. While there is a debate on the role 
of technocrats and their ideology within the literature, for most, technocrats have clear pro-
market preferences (Santiso 2003; Dargent 2015). 
 
To sum up, while we cannot a priori identify a particular ideological leaning for technocrats 
on the left-right dimension, we expect they have clear policy preferences based on their 
education and professional background. Therefore, to identify the policy preferences of 
technocrats we rely on their professional background just like we would do with elected 
politicians. However, what distinguishes technocrats from partisans or technopols is their 
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commitment to a policy and in turn perhaps the intensity of their policy preferences 
compared to partisan experts. The crucial question, however, is even in the presence of 
commitment, why would technocrats be able to influence policy in line with their own policy 
preferences? I address this question next.  
 
TechnocratsÕ Policy Influence 
Unfortunately, the literature on the policy effects of technocrats is limited. McDonnell and 
Valbruzzi (2014) find that technocratic-led governments are associated with neo-liberal 
labour market reforms in Europe. Yet, there only have been 13 such governments during 
periods of grave economic or political instability. The only large-n empirical evidence 
regarding the policy effects of technocrat finance ministers is provided in a conference paper 
by Alexiadou and Gunaydin (2015). Using data from 13 West European, they find that 
technocrat ministers of finance are associated with cuts in social spending. This result is 
robust to a number of specifications and holds even after controlling for the presence of 
financial crises as well as a battery of other controls. Yet, the question remains to what extent 
are technocratsÕ neoliberal policy effects an outcome of their own policy preferences or of 
voters who are faced with major financial crises. 
  
Although within the large literature on economic and political transitions in Latin America, 
we find more extensive accounts of the role of technocrats, most studies are limited to 
specific country-cases (Dominguez 1997; Joignant 2011; Dargent 2015).  An exception is a 
recently published article by Kaplan (2017) who studies the appointments and policy effects 
of economic advisors across sixteen Latin American countries since the nineteen sixties. 
Even though Kaplan (2017) uses the broader definition of technocrats as all cabinet ministers, 
executive advisors and central bank governors, his work is unique in that it is the first large-n 
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study on the policy effects of economists. Furthermore, Kaplan (2017) distinguishes 
technocrats as orthodox and heterodox economists. He finds that orthodox economists are 
more likely to be appointed during periods of economic downturns, mostly by left-leaning 
cabinets that need to appear as credible reformers. In turn, these orthodox economists are 
associated with fiscal contractions. In contrast, during good economic times, left-wing 
governments are more likely to appoint heterodox economists who are more concerned about 
economic growth than about economic stability.  
 
Expertise 
KaplanÕs work is in agreement with other work that advances the argument that pro-market 
technocrats are appointed to lend credibility to governments. Governments achieve higher 
credibility by appointing technocrats for two main reasons: their expertise and their clear-
market conforming policy preferences. According to these accounts then (Dargent 2015; 
Santiso 2003), technocrats are appointed for their expertise and credibility, even when their 
policy preferences do not align with the presidentÕs. The more presidents rely on technocratsÕ 
expertise to deliver positive economic results that are electorally beneficially, the more likely 
their appointments are. 
 
Under the principal-agent framework, as long as policy reforms advance presidentsÕ political 
goals, they will appoint technocrats to deliver the reforms (Geddes 1990). However, 
principal-agent accounts have been challenged by illustrating that technocratsÕ expertise 
provides political goods that go beyond and are even independent of policy outcomes. 
Dargente (2015) explicitly deals with the question of the source of technocratic power. The 
author asks: Òis their power derived from other actors or do they enjoy autonomy?Ó He 
studies the role of expert appointees Ð whether they are ministers or advisors in executive 
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bodies, but not permanent bureaucrats- in Colombia and Peru over decades, and finds that 
they have a significant policy effect that goes well beyond the policy mandates given to them 
by the politicians who appoint them. For Dargent (2015) technocratsÕ source of power is their 
expertise and politiciansÕ dependence on that expertise for electoral reasons. He illustrates 
that once technocratic teams are formed, they manage to entrench themselves in the agencies 
they are appointed, even though their appointments are not permanent. ÒExperts frequently 
use their knowledge to purposively exclude less-technically trained actors from 
policymaking, divert political and socioeconomic pressures, build informal and formal 
institutions that guarantee their positionsÕ stability, and form alliances with other actors to 
advance their technical preferences. Through these strategies, experts actively aim to build 
technocratic autonomy and achieve continuity in their positionsÓ (Dargent 2015).  
 
One might wonder how generalizable DargentÕs findings are. After all, governmentsÕ need 
for expertise varies significantly by the level of expertise within their permanent 
bureaucracies, the complexity of the policy as well as by the state of the economy. For 
example, most rich, industrialized countries have professional and extensive bureaucracies. 
Nonetheless, even within Europe, expertise is also considered central in appointing 
technocrat ministers due to the increasingly complex policy environment created by 
European integration (Bck et al. 2009) and the lack in expertise within parliamentary groups 
(Yong and Hazell 2011).  
 
Commitment to market conforming policies during economic crises 
Expertise is often linked to another, more political and consequential motive for appointing 
technocrats. Presidents or prime ministersÕ need to commit to a certain set of policies. 
Particularly during economic crises, presidents or prime ministers are pressed to signal to 
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voters and investors their policy intentions. For example, in Latin America presidents have 
had to commit to voters that their use of patronage will be drastically reduced (Magaloni 
2006). One way of doing that is by delegating policy to technocrats. Committing to investors 
has also been an equally important problem for presidents. According to Santiso (2003), 
appointing pro-market friendly technocrats are crucial for gaining investor confidence. 
According to Schneider (1998), presidents become dependent on technocrats as long as  
investor confidence is necessary for positive electoral results. Once economic conditions 
improve, presidents do not need technocrats and technocrats, in turn, cease to control policy. 
Unfortunately, while these case-based accounts are enlightening, we lack systematic large-n 
evidence outside Latin America on the role of technocrats during and outside financial crises. 
Even more importantly the theory behind the role of technocrats as commitment devises 
raises important questions. If technocrats are appointees, how can they commit prime 
ministers and presidents to any sort of policy action?  
 
Questions for Future Research 
Managing economic expectations is crucial in politics, and even more so during periods of 
economic crises. Citizens and markets form expectations regarding the abilities and 
intentions of newly elected government. Will they deliver their policy announcements? Will 
they manage the economy successfully? In turn, these expectations affect votersÕ and, 
primarily, investorsÕ decisions to trust or not, a government and its debt. While in most 
economically advanced democracies investors are confident that governments will honour 
their debt obligations, that confidence is often absent towards emerging economies but it also 
can be shaken when the economies of rich countries suffer major shocks that lead to high 
levels of unemployment and higher debt  (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). This is what happened 
during the 2008 financial crisis in Europe, for example. Not just smaller countries, like 
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Greece or Portugal, but also major economic powers, such as Italy and France saw the 
interest rates on their government bonds rise dramatically.  
 
Governments have several ways of addressing problems of credible commitment, namely that 
their policy announcements at time t will be delivered at time t+1. Delegating policy to an 
independent bureaucrat is the best-known solution for making a credible commitment. The 
de-politicisation of monetary policy rests on the assumption that bureaucrats have long-term 
horizons whereas politicians are tempted to use monetary policy for short-term political gain, 
creating political business cycles (Alberto and Summers 1993). The delegation of monetary 
policy to politically independent central banks was historically motivated by the need to 
shape anti-inflationary expectations that would lead to a more optimal and stable 
macroeconomic policy (Bodea and Hicks 2015; Bodea and Higashijima 2017). When it 
comes to fiscal policy, however, delegation is more problematic and in fact delegation to 
independent bureaucrats is not possible.  
 
Fiscal policy has direct distributive and redistributive effects, and while everyone agrees with 
the goals of low unemployment and high growth, not everyone agrees on how to achieve 
them (Alesina and Tabellini 2007, 2008). Probably the most radical political response to 
increasing the fiscal credibility of governments is the establishment of fiscal rules such as 
those imposed by the European Union. Although compliance to the EUÕs fiscal rules has 
historically been uneven, the 2009 debt and financial crisis saw many indebted member states 
stipulate explicit fiscal targets in their constitution significantly reducing their spending 
discretion. Moreover, in 2012 the vast majority of the EU member states signed the European 
Fiscal Compact which renews their commitment to balanced budgets and strengthens the role 
of monitoring institutions (Doray-Demers and Foucault 2017).  
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Nonetheless, across the industrialized European democracies, perhaps the most successful 
mechanism of commitment to specific fiscal targets and policies is writing extensive 
government programs, also known as coalition agreements. Coalition agreements often set 
fiscal targets that are monitored by the government and provide a strong commitment 
mechanism to reduce public deficit (Hallerberg 2004; Hallerberg, Strauch, and Hagen 2009). 
Coalition agreements not only provide concrete information regarding the governmentÕs 
policy intentions but are also commitment mechanisms to the extent that the coalition 
partners police each other in upholding the agreement (Kluver and Back 2017). This might 
explain why investors are more trusting of coalition governments than of single party 
governments, despite their slower decision-making processes (Breen and McMenamin 2013; 
Sattler 2013).  
 
Yet, not all governments can form stable multiparty coalitions particularly during periods of 
major economic and financial turbulence. Since 2009, many European governments, 
especially those that lack multiple institutional and partisan veto players resembled more to 
Argentina than to Germany. Particularly south European countries sought to increase their 
credibility towards the markets by appointing technocrats (Roberts 2017; Alexiadou and 
Gunaydin 2015). Despite the fact that appointing strong partisan finance ministers to 
safeguard the governmentÕs budget and cut public debt has been a common practice in single 
party governments (Hallerberg 2004), the appointments of technocrats to the top economic 
positions in the government are uncommon. What have the policy effects, if any, of these 
appointments been? Have they adopted reforms with lasting policy effects? Are these 
appointments the result of votersÕ discontent with partisan politics and an alternative to party 
government (Caramani 2017; Bertsou and Pastorella 2017)? Do technocratic appointments 
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signal the beginning of the weakening of party government in ways that resemble the post-
crises political systems of Latin American countries (Roberts 2017)?  
 
Before closing this essay, I should also caution the reader as to the potential similarities in the 
role of technocrats across political systems and continents. Technocratic appointments are not 
as simple as they might at first look. Appointing an outside expert to the most consequential 
post in government carries serious implications for prime ministers. Fundamental differences 
exist between the presidential systems of Latin America and the parliamentary and semi-
presidential systems of Europe. If appointing a technocrat sends a strong signal to voters and 
markets, then deselecting her sends an even stronger signal of policy reversal. Thus we, as a 
discipline, need to further study and develop theories of ministerial selection and of 
technocratic appointments that do not rely on theories that emerged in presidential 
democracies.  
 
Not only the organization of political power varies between presidential and parliamentary 
systems, but also politiciansÕ career concerns. In presidential systems, non-partisans and 
technocrats are common (Amorim and Samuels 2010). Their appointments do not have a 
direct effect on representation since the members of parliament are the primary law makers. 
In contrast, in parliamentary systems the vast majority of finance and economic ministers, are 
elected and have constituencies. Unlike elected politicians, technocrats have not made 
commitments to voters, and their professional career is not subject to voter approval (Blondel 
1991; Grossman 2014; Drazen and Ozbay 2015). Consequently, it is very likely that the 
appointment of technocrats in parliamentary systems have larger economic and political 
effects compared to presidential systems.   
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